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Recent Decisions

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DOUBLE

JEOPARDY

CLAUSE

OF

THE

FIFTH

OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that where the interests of the Commonwealth
have been sufficiently vindicated in a federal prosecution, a subsequent
state prosecution for conduct resultant from the same act will be
AMENDMENT-DOCTRINE

barred.
Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638 (1971).
On March 11, 1969 appellant, Ronald Edward Mills, was indicted in
Philadelphia county and charged with carrying a concealed weapon,

unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license1 and aggravated robbery. 2 The charges arose out of the robbery of the Crusader Savings
and Loan Association, a federally insured savings and loan association
in Philadelphia. Subsequently appellant was indicted on April 9, 1969
in the United States District court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the federal offenses of bank robbery and assault.8 These
charges arose out of the same robbery of the Crusader Savings and
Loan Association. Mills pleaded guilty to the federal charges and was
sentenced to five years imprisonment. 4 After receiving this federal imprisonment sentence, Mills petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County for dismissal of the state charges. He alleged that
a state prosecution following a federal prosecution for the same transaction would subject him to double jeopardy.5 The court of common
pleas dismissed the petition and Mills then pleaded guilty to the state
charges. 6 The appellant received a sentence of five years probation for
carrying a concealed weapon and three years probation for unlawfully
carrying a firearm without a license. The aggravated robbery charges
were dismissed.7 The probations imposed by the state court were to
run concurrently but following the five year federal imprisonment
sentence. 8 Appellant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court alleging double jeopardy. The superior court affirmed the trial court,9
1. Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 6106 (Supp.
1973).
2. Act of June 24, 1939, Pa. P.L. 872, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3701 (Supp.
1973).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a)-(b), (d) (1970).
4. Commonwealth v. Mills, 217 Pa. Super. 269, 269 A.2d 322, vacated, 447 Pa. 163, 286
A.2d 638 (1971).
5. 447 Pa. at 166.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Commonwealth v. Mills, 217 Pa. Super. 269, 269 A.2d 322 (1970).
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relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bartkus v.
Illinois,o which held that successive federal and state prosecutions did

not constitute double jeopardy and are permissible based on the doctrine of dual sovereignty. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted
allocatur.1"
The main issue in this case concerns the friction between the two apparently conflicting doctrines of dual sovereignty and double jeopardy.
The court held that where the interests of the Commonwealth have
been sufficiently vindicated under the judicial proceedings of the federal sovereign, a subsequent judicial proceeding by the state sovereign
12
will be barred.
In reaching its decision the court recognized the continued validity
3 and its companion case Abbate v. United
of Bartkus v. Illinois"
4
States.1 In Abbate the Court permitted a prosecution by the state government followed by a prosecution by the federal government.' 5 Both
Bartkus and Abbate rested on the principle of dual sovereignty of fed8
eral and state governments as enunciated in United States v. Lanza.'
Notwithstanding the Pennsylvania court's recognition of the continued
viability of Bartkus and Abbate, the court concluded that successive
7
prosecutions should nonetheless be barred in the instant case.
The court in reaching its holding utilized an interest analysis approach whereby a subsequent state prosecution is barred if the interests of the Commonwealth have been sufficiently litigated in the federal forum."' The main portion of the court's opinion, however, is
concerned with the right of the individual not to be put in jeopardy
twice. The court stated:
We are talking about two governments protecting their interests,
when we really should be talking about the individual, since by
focusing on the individual we see that it matters little where he
fact is that his liberty
is confined-in a federal or state prison-the
is taken away twice for the same offense. 19
10. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
11. Id. at 166.
12. Id. at 171-72.
13. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
14. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
15. Id. at 188.
16. 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
17. 447 Pa. at 172.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 170. The holding of the court seems to rest on one principle: that the interests of both sovereigns coincide. Supportive reasoning emphasized the individual's
right not to be put in jeopardy twice.
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Justice Barbierri's dissent 20 indicated his dissatisfaction with the
majority opinion's interest analysis test for determining whether a
prior federal prosecution will serve as a bar to a subsequent state prosecution. He stated that the court's opinion has propounded a double
jeopardy rule which places Pennsylvania in a unique position in dual
sovereignty cases. As a result the question of double jeopardy will be
a question of fact rather than a question of law and will not depend
upon conviction or acquittal in the prior proceeding, but rather upon
the nature of the sentence imposed. In addition he emphasized that
there will be inequality in treatment of similarly situated defendants
based solely upon the result of a race for forum. For example, if one
defendant is first prosecuted in Pennsylvania the federal government
is free to institute a federal prosecution. 2' Whereas, a defendant involved in the same transaction who is first prosecuted by federal authorities will escape prosecution in Pennsylvania if the interests of the
state have been sufficiently vindicated in the federal prosecution. Although he recognized the object of the majority opinion, i.e., to relieve
the individual from the burden of two prosecutions, the dissenter
would affirm the superior court because of the continued viability of
Bartkus and the validity of the dual sovereignty distinction set forth
in it.
In Bartkus2 2 the defendant was acquitted by a federal jury of robbing

a federally insured savings and loan association but was convicted in
Illinois for armed robbery under Illinois law.2 8 Because the fifth

amendment double jeopardy clause was not made applicable to the
states until ten years after Bartkus, when Benton v. Maryland24 was
decided, the Bartkus majority did not consider valid the claim that
successive prosecutions by federal and state sovereigns may constitute
double jeopardy.2 5 Instead the opinion emphasized the concept of dual
sovereignty; that both the federal and state governments have separate
20. Id. at 175.
21. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1959, f 1, at 1. col. 4 (statement of then Attorney General
William P. Rogers):
After a state prosecution, there should be no federal trial for the same act . . .
unless the reasons are compelling. We should continue to make every effort to
cooperate with the state and local authorities to the end that the trial occur in the
jurisdiction, whether it be state or federal, where the public interest is best served.
If this be determined accurately, and is followed by efficient and intelligent cooperation by state and federal law enforcement authorities, the consideration of a
second prosecution very seldom Will arise.
22. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
23. Id. at 121-22.
24. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
25. 359 U.S. at 127.
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interests to protect and each is therefore independently responsible
for enforcement of its own law. 28 The opinion stated that to bar successive prosecutions would enable one sovereign to interfere with the
administration of the other's criminal law.2 7 Justice Black in his dissent 2s focused in on the problem from the standpoint of the individual

and concluded that a second trial for the same act is just as repulsive
When it takes place in an independent sovereign as when it takes place
within the same sovereign, There is still double punishment from two
to the
trials by two sovereigns. Such punishment hurts the individual
29
same extent as when it is imposed by the same sovereign.
Abbate v. United States"° involved the precise issue of dual sover,
eignty discussed in Bartkus except that the first trial was held in the
state forum and was followed by a trial in the federal forum. The defendant was charged in federal court with the offense of destroying
United States communications property which carries a sentence of up
to ten years imprisonment 81 In state court the defendant was charged
with the crime of conspiring to destroy another's property which carries a sentence of three months imprisonment. The Court pointed out
that if a successful state prosecution imposing a three month prison
sentence would serve to bar a subsequent federal prosecution carrying
a potential imprisonment term of ten years, such a bar would infringe
8 2
upon the law enforcement authority of the federal government.
Again dissenting, Justice Black emphasized the double jeopardy with
respect to the individual who is punished twice for the same offense,
once by the state and once by the United States.8 3
Both the Barthus and Abbate decisions were based on United States
v. Lanza.34 Lanza was the first decision expressly authorizing successive
prosecutions by state and federal courts based on the doctrine of dual
sovereignty. The Court stated that a conviction and punishment in a
26. Id. at 131.
27. Id. at 137.
28. Id. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
'
If double punishment is what is feared it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns . to inflict it than for one.
30. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
31; 19 U;S.C. § 1362 (1966).
32. 359 U.S. at 195.
33. Id; at 203 (Black, J., dissenting), For a discussion of successive prosecutions by
state and federal governments, see Note, Successive Prosecutions by State and Federal
Governments for Offenses Arising Out of the Same Act, 44 MINN. L. Rv. 534 (1960).
See also Comment, Double Prosecutions by State and Federal Governments: Another
Exercise in Federalism, 80 HARV. L. Rv. 1538 (1967).
34. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
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state court under state law will not bar a subsequent conviction and
punishment in a federal court under federal law for the same conduct."5 The Court further stated:
Each government in determining what shall be an offense against
its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of
the other. It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both
national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and
dignity of both, and may be punished by each. 36
The basis for the Lanza decision was derived from dicta in the prior
cases of Fox v. Ohio,8

Illinios.39

7

United States v. Marigold8 and Moore v.

The issue in each of these cases concerned the power of the
state and federal governments to enact laws aimed at proscribing the
same criminal conduct.40 The Fox Court, relying on the principle of
dual sovereignty, held that where a state law is not repugnant to the
United States Constitution it is within a state's power as an independent sovereign to legislate for the protection of its own peace and
dignity.41 The Court's dicta in Fox,42 Marigold43 and Moore"4 recognized that because the state and federal governments have concurrent
criminal jurisdiction there exists a possibility of double prosecution
and punishment. In Moore45 the Court further stated in dicta, however, that if a person is subjected to successive prosecutions by federal
and state governments the offender is not punished twice for the same
offense but is punished once for one state offense and once for one
46
federal offense which happened to arise from the same act.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 385.
Id. at 382.
46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).

39. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).

40. See Note, Double Prosecutions by State and Federal Governments: Another
Exercise in Federalism 80 HARv. L. REV. 1538, 1541 (1967). The author points out that
at the time of the decisions of Fox, Marigold and Moore slavery and state sovereignty
were prime political issues. Therefore, any restrictions placed on the state power to
punish criminal offenses by denying concurrent jurisdiction, or by outlawing successive
prosecutions, would have resulted in violent opposition in the Southern states.
41. 46 U.S. at 433-34.
42. Id. at 435.
43. 50 U.S. at 569.
44. 55 U.S. at 20.
45. Id.
46. In one early case, Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1820), there is
some language to the effect that there would be a bar to a second prosecution by a
different government. It was the belief of the majority, however, that the state statute
in question imposed state sanctions for violations of a federal criminal law. Therefore,
this case stands for the proposition that a bar to a subsequent state prosecution
will exist only where the state prosecution is based on the same statute under which
the proscribed conduct has already been tried in the courts of another jurisdiction.
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United States v. Cruikshank47 was one of a series of cases, prior to
Lanza, reaffirming the principle of dual sovereignty set forth in Fox.
The Court stated that persons within the United States are subject to
the laws of both federal and state governments. As a necessary consequence it may happen that an individual will be prosecuted and
48
punished by each government for the same act.

It is this necessary consequence of dual sovereignty, i.e., the possibility of double jeopardy, that was the primary concern of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mills.49 At the time of the Bartkus decision,
the United States Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticut" had held
that the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause was not applicable to
the states. 51 Therefore, the Barthus Court concluded that its decision
was not only based on the principle of dual sovereignty but also on the
fact that successive prosecutions by federal and state sovereigns did not
constitute double jeopardy.52 Since the fifth amendment was not binding on the states, the majority of the Bartkus Court did not view double
jeopardy as being in friction with the principle of dual sovereignty.
Justice Black, however, in his dissent argued that double jeopardy
should be an important consideration.5 3
In Benton v. Maryland54 the United States Supreme Court overruled
Palko and held that the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause was
binding on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 5 The Benton Court established that a state could no
longer repeatedly retry a man for the same crime. 56 The Court was
silent, however, as to the effect of its ruling on Bartkus. The only
mention of the Bartkus decision was in reference to Justice Black's
dissent concerning the concept of double jeopardy.57 Thus, it is sug47. 92 U.S. 588 (1875).
48. Id. at 590-91.
The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to two governments: one State and the other National; but there need be no conflict between
the two. . . . True, it may sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both
jurisdictions for one and the same act. . . . He owes allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the penalties which
each exact for the disobedience of its laws.
49. 447 Pa. at 170.
50. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
51. Id. at 328.
52. 359 U.S. at 132-33.
53. Id. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).
54. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
55. Id. at 787, 794.
56. Id. at 796.
57. Id. at 795. The fact that the Benton court cited the dissenting opinion by Justice
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gested that the majority of the Benton Court indicated by their silence
that the Bartkus holding was primarily based on the concept of dual
sovereignty and secondarily on the non-applicability of the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause to the states. Therefore, successive federal
and state criminal prosecutions for the same conduct were still permissible under Bartkus.58 .
The Pennsylvania decision in support of its unique approach to
successive prosecutions cited State v. Fletcher," an Ohio appeals court
decision. This Ohio decision held that a federal prosecution followed
by a state prosecution constituted double jeopardy. The, Mills Court,
however, failed to note that the Ohio appeals court decision was reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court. 0 Justice Corrigan, speaking for
the Ohio Supreme Court, stated that it was bound to follow the constitutional guidelines which the United States Supreme Court established in Bartkus.61
The dual sovereignty doctrine has been sustained as a viable doctrine
and followed with respect to decisions involving military and territorial
courts, 62 and state and city courts.63 The fact that the interests of the

military and territorial courts or the state and city courts may have
64
been the same was not considered of significance.
In contrast, the dual sovereignty doctrine has been disregarded in
favor of the rights of the individual in cases involving the fifth amendBlack in Bartkius may suggest that the Benton court was in disagreement with the Bartkus
holding.
58. For a discussion of double jeopardy as it relates to Bartkus and Abbate see Brant,
Overruling Bartkus and Abbate: A New Standard for Double Jeopardy, 11 WASHBURN
L.J. 188 (1971-72).
59. 22 Ohio App. 2d 83, 259 N.E.2d 146 (1970), rev'd, 26 Ohio St. 2d 221, 271 N.E.2d
567 (1971).
60. 26 Ohio St. 2d 221, 271 N.E.2d 567 (1971).
61. Id. at 225, 271 N.E.2d at 569.
62. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907). This case concerned a military court
martial barring a subsequent territorial proceeding. The Court held that the two courts
derived their jurisdiction from the same authority-the federal government. Therefore,
a second prosecution constituted double jeopardy. The Court stated:
. the cases holding that the same acts committed in a state of the Union may constitute an oflense against the United States and also a distinct offense against the
State do not apply here, where the two tribunals that tried the accused exert all
their powers under and by authority of the same government-that of the United
States.
Id. at 354-55. See also Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937); United States v. La
Plant, 156 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mont. 1957).
63. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). This Court held that both the municipal
court and state court owe their source of authority to the same sovereign and therefore
a second prosecution is barred. Id. at 394-95.
64. But see People v. Wendel, 59 Misc. 354, 112 N.Y.S. 301 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed,
128 App. Div. 437, 112 N.Y.S. 837 (1908).
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ment protection against self-incrimination 5 and the fourth amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 66
Lanza, Bartkus and Abbate are all based on the concept of dual
sovereignty. Specifically these cases stand for the proposition that the
state and federal governments are independent sovereigns, each responsible for prosecuting and punishing conduct proscribed as criminal
under their criminal codes. The fact that the same conduct may give
rise to successive prosecutions by federal and state authorities, thereby
imposing a double punishment on the individual, is of no concern to
the two governments vindicating their interests. When Benton v. Maryland67 made the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause,
the Court was silent as to what effect its decision had on Bartkus.
Therefore, although the fifth amendment was made applicable to the
States, the Bartkus holding was apparently still good law.
The problem confronting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
that the United States Supreme Court, as evidenced by Bartkus, did
not view the concepts of double jeopardy and dual sovereignty as being
in conflict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with a case
which it viewed as one of apparent double jeopardy, but which the
United States Supreme Court might view as a proper exercise of state
power based on dual sovereignty. To resolve what the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court viewed as an apparent conflict between the principles
of double jeopardy and dual sovereignty a unique decision was reached.
The decision is grounded upon the premise that if the interests of the
Commonwealth have been fully vindicated in a prior federal proceeding, then a subsequent state proceeding is barred. Thus, the court
discounts the fact that there are two sovereigns each permitted to vindicate their interests independently when the interests are the same. 68
In effect, the Pennsylvania court has held that when the interests of
65. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). The Court held that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law, and a federal witness against incrimination under
state as well as federal law. Id. at 77-78.
66. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Court prohibited the use by federal authorities of evidence illegally seized by state authorities. The Court stated:
To the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded by
a federal agent or by a state officer.
Id. at 215.
67. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
68. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). This case represents
an application of the separate sovereign doctrine in international law. See also Franck,
An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1096 (1959).
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the state have been fully litigated in a prior federal forum, then a
subsequent state proceeding stemming from the same act constitutes
69
double jeopardy.
Because double jeopardy is the import of the Pennsylvania court's
analysis, it stands in apparent conflict with the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Bartkus. The Bartkus court neglected to consider
the interest of the individual, to which the Pennsylvania court has
given primary consideration under circumstances where the state's
interests have been satisfied in a prior federal proceeding. It is suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under the facts of Mills
has made an appropriate and necessary decision and, therefore, ought
to be followed by the highest court in the land. Therefore, the United
States Supreme Court ought to overrule Bartkus in order to permit
double jeopardy to serve as a defense to a state prosecution following
a federal prosecution where the state's interest has been sufficiently
vindicated. To maintain judicial consistency in decision making, the
Court ought to overrule Abbate v. United States70 and permit double
jeopardy to serve as a defense to a federal prosecution following a state
prosecution where the federal interest has been sufficiently vindicated.
C. Steven Miller
NoTE: Subsequent to the decision by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Mills, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted section III of the Crimes Code.71 The statute bars a
AUTHOR'S

69. Fifteen state jurisdictions have provided a statutory double jeopardy defense for
any person prosecuted in a state court after being tried in a federal court for the same
offense. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 3-4 (1972). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10
(Prop. Offic.. Draft 1962).
70. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (1973) states:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this Commonwealth and of the United States or another state, a prosecution in any such
other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this Commonwealth under
the following circumstances: (1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in
a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution
barred by former prosecution for same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is
based on the same conduct unless: (i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly
convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each
requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such
offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or (ii) the
second offense was not consummated when the former trial began. (2) The former
prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an acquittal or by
a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed
or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the
offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
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